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We introduce a semantics for epistemic logic exploiting a belief base abstraction. Differently from
existing Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic in which the notions of possible world and epis-
temic alternative are primitive, in the proposed semantics they are non-primitive but are defined from
the concept of belief base. We show that this semantics allows us to define the universal epistemic
model in a simpler and more compact way than existing inductive constructions of it. We provide (i)
a number of semantic equivalence results for both the basic epistemic language with ‘individual be-
lief’ operators and its extension by the notion of ‘only believing’, and (ii) a lower bound complexity
result for epistemic logic model checking relative to the universal epistemic model.
1 Introduction
Type spaces were introduced by Harsanyi [22] in order to formally represent higher-order probabilistic
beliefs of rational players in strategic situations. The notion of universal type space was studied in detail
by Mertens & Zamir [36]: it is defined to be the “largest” type space which contains all possible states of
the world as well as all possible belief hierarchies of the players. Mertens & Zamir showed that, under
certain topological assumptions, every Harsanyi type space can be mapped to the universal type space
by a morphism which preserves the current state of the world as well as the players’ belief hierarchies.
Alternative constructions of the universal type space under different topological assumptions can be
found in [9, 23]. Heifez & Samet [24] proved a variant of Mertens & Zamir’s result for the general
measure-theoretic case. Battigalli & Siniscalchi [2] extended the universal type space construction to
conditional probabilistic beliefs. More recently, Bjorndahl & Halpern [7] provided a logical analysis of
the probabilistic structure of the universal type space.1
A qualitative version of the universal type space was introduced by Fagin et al. [12] (see also [13]).
Specifically, Fagin et al. provided a construction of the “largest” (or “universal”) epistemic model for
the epistemic logic S5n which contains all possible knowledge hierarchies of the agents in the system.
They studied its relationship with the standard multi-relational semantics of epistemic logic [14] both
for the basic epistemic language with ‘individual knowledge’ operators and for its extension by common
knowledge operators.
Both constructions of the universal epistemic model in its probabilistic version à la Mertens & Zamir
and in its qualitative version à la Fagin et al. are inductive. One has to define first the set of possible
states of the world. Then, the agents’ first-order beliefs about the states of the world are defined. In the
third step, one has to define the agents’ second-order beliefs about the states of nature and the agents’
1An analysis of the relationship between Harsanyi’s type spaces and the multi-relational Kripke semantics of epistemic logic
can be found in [15].
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first-order beliefs, and so on so forth. More generally, in order to define an agent’s k+1-order belief one
has to define first the agents’ k-order beliefs.
The general aim of the present paper is to offer a simple and compact construction of the universal
epistemic model that does not require an inductive construction of the agents’ belief hierarchies, as in
Mertens & Zamir’s and Fagin et al.’s definitions. Our construction of the universal epistemic model is
based on a semantics for epistemic logic exploiting a belief base abstraction which was recently intro-
duced in [33]. Differently from existing multi-relational Kripke semantics for epistemic logic in which
the notions of possible world and epistemic alternative are primitive, in the belief base semantics they are
non-primitive but are defined from the concept of belief base. Specifically, in this semantics it is assumed
that at a given state s agent i considers state s′ possible if and only if s′ satisfies all formulas that are
included in agent i’s belief base at s.
The initial motivation for introducing such a semantics was to bridge two traditions that have rarely
talked to each other in the past. On the one hand, we have epistemic logic: it started in the 60s with the
seminal work of Hintikka [26] on the logics of knowledge and belief, it was extended to the multi-agent
setting at the end of 80s [14, 37] and then furtherly developed during the last 20 years, the period of the
“dynamic turn”, with growing research on dynamic epistemic logic [11]. On the other hand, we have
syntactic approaches to knowledge representation and reasoning mainly proposed in the area of artificial
intelligence (AI). The latter includes, for instance, work on belief base and knowledge base revision
[20, 21, 4], belief base merging [29], input-output logic [35], as well as more recent work on the so-
called “database perspective” to the theory of intention by [39]. All these approaches defend the idea that
right level of abstraction for modeling rational agents is the “belief base” (or “knowledge base”) level
whereby the agent is identified with the set of facts that she believes (or knows).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the belief base semantics for epistemic
logic, as defined in [33, 34]. We show how the basic language with ‘individual belief’ operators can
be interpreted on this semantics. We also show how the semantics can be easily incorporate the belief
correctness assumption, thereby allowing us to model knowledge instead of belief. We show that the
belief base semantics is equivalent to the standard multi-relational Kripke semantics, in the sense that
they lead to the same set of validities. Section 3 is the core of the paper: we define the universal epistemic
model with the help of the belief base semantics. As emphasized above, our definition is simpler and more
compact than existing definitions of the universal epistemic model, since it does not require an inductive
construction of the agents’ belief hierarchies. We show that, as far as the basic epistemic language with
‘individual belief’ operators is concerned, the set of validities relative to the universal epistemic model
and the set of validities relative to the generic belief base semantics are the same. In Section 4, we
extend the basic epistemic language by the notion of ‘only believing’. We show that the equivalence
between the two semantics does not hold anymore in the context of this more expressive language:
the universal epistemic model has more validities than the generic belief base semantics. Section 5 is
devoted to the comparison between Fagin et al.’s inductive construction of the universal epistemic model
and the construction of Section 3 exploiting belief bases. In particular, we show that, from the point of
the basic epistemic language and of its extension by the notion of ‘only believing’, there is no difference
between the two constructions, as they give rise to the same set of validities. In Section 6, we provide
a compact formulation of epistemic logic model checking which exploits the definition of the universal
epistemic model given in Section 3. We show that such a compact formulation makes epistemic logic
model checking PSPACE-hard, whereas standard epistemic logic model checking relative to the multi-
relational Kripke semantics is polynomial in the size of the model and the length of the formula. In
Section 7, we conclude.
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2 Belief base semantics for epistemic logic
In this section, we present a semantics for epistemic logic (EL) in which the accessibility relations in an
epistemic model are not primitive but they are defined from the primitive concept of multi-agent belief
base. The semantics was first introduced in [33].
2.1 Multi-agent belief base models
Assume a countably infinite set of atomic propositions Atm = {p,q, . . .} and a finite set of agents Agt =
{1, . . . ,n}.
We define the languageL0(Atm,Agt) by the following grammar in Backus-Naur Form (BNF):
α ::= p | ¬α | α1∧α2 | 4iα
where p ranges over Atm and i ranges over Agt. L0(Atm,Agt) is the language for representing explicit
beliefs of multiple agents. For simplicity, we sometimes write L0 instead of L0(Atm,Agt), when the
context is unambiguous. The formula 4iα can be read as “agent i explicitly believes that α is true”
or “α is in agent i’s belief base”. In this language, we can represent higher-order explicit beliefs, for
example4i4 jα express the fact that agent i explicitly believes that agent j explicitly believes that α is
true.
Definition 1 (Multi-agent belief base). A multi-agent belief base (MBB) is a tuple B = (B1, . . . ,Bn,V)
where (i) for every i∈ Agt, Bi ⊆L0 is agent i’s belief base, and (ii) V ⊆ Atm is the actual state. The class
of MBBs is denoted by B.
Formulas of the languageL0 are interpreted relative to MBBs as follows.
Definition 2 (Satisfaction relation for formulas inL0). Let B=(B1, . . . ,Bn,V)∈B. Then, the satisfaction
relation |= between B and formulas inL0 is defined as follows:
B |= p ⇐⇒ p ∈ V
B |= ¬α ⇐⇒ B 6|= α
B |= α1∧α2 ⇐⇒ B |= α1 and B |= α2
B |=4iα ⇐⇒ α ∈ Bi
Definition 3 (Correct MBB). Let B = (B1, . . . ,Bn,V) ∈ B. We say that B is correct if and only if, for all
i ∈ Agt and for all α ∈L0, if α ∈ Bi then B |= α . The class of correct MBBs is denoted by CB.
The following definition introduces the concept of epistemic alternative.
Definition 4 (Epistemic alternatives). Let B,B′ ∈B. Then, BRiB′ if and only if, for every α ∈ Bi, B′ |= α ,
where the satisfaction relation |= follows Definition 2.
BRiB′ means that B′ is an epistemic alternative for agent i at B. The idea of the previous definition is
that B′ is an epistemic alternative for agent i at B if and only if, B′ satisfies all facts that agent i explicitly
believes at B.
A multi-agent belief model (MAB) is defined to be a multi-agent belief base supplemented with
a set of multi-agent belief bases, called context. The latter includes all multi-agent belief bases that are
compatible with the agents’ common ground [40], i.e., the body of information that the agents commonly
believe to be the case.
Definition 5 (Multi-agent belief model). A multi-agent belief model (MBM) is a pair (B,Cxt), where
B ∈ B and Cxt ⊆ B. The class of MBMs is denoted by M.
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2.2 Interpretation of epistemic logic language
Thanks to the epistemic accessibility relations defined in Definition 4, we are able to interpret the lan-
guage of epistemic logic relative to MBMs. Such language is denoted by LEL(Atm,Agt) and is defined
by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1∧ϕ2 |iϕ
where p ranges over Atm and i ranges over Agt. For simplicity, we writeLEL instead ofLEL(Atm,Agt),
when the context is unambiguous. The other Boolean constructions >, ⊥, ∨,→ and↔ are defined from
p, ¬ and ∧ in the usual way.
The formula iϕ has to be read “agent i implicitly (or potentially) believes that ϕ is true” in the
sense that agent i can derive ϕ from her explicit beliefs (i.e., from the information in her belief base). For
the sake of simplicity, we sometimes read the formula iϕ as “agent i believes that ϕ”. We define the
dual operator ♦i as follows:
♦iϕ def= ¬i¬ϕ.
♦iϕ has to be read “ϕ is compatible (or consistent) with agent i’s explicit beliefs”.
As usual, for every formula ϕ ∈LEL we denote by Atm(ϕ) the set of atoms in Atm occurring in ϕ .
We are ready to define what it means for a multi-agent belief model (MBM) (B,Cxt) to satisfy a
formula ϕ inLEL, written (B,Cxt) |= ϕ .
Definition 6 (Satisfaction relation for formulas inLEL). Let B=(B1, . . . ,Bn,V)∈B and let (B,Cxt)∈M.
Then:
(B,Cxt) |= p ⇐⇒ p ∈ V
(B,Cxt) |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ (B,Cxt) 6|= ϕ
(B,Cxt) |= ϕ ∧ψ ⇐⇒ (B,Cxt) |= ϕ and (B,Cxt) |= ψ
(B,Cxt) |=iϕ ⇐⇒ ∀B′ ∈ Cxt : if BRiB′ then (B′,Cxt) |= ϕ
Note that, according to the last clause, an agent i implicitly believes that ϕ (i.e., iϕ) if and only if
ϕ is true at all states that are compatible with the information in i’s belief base.
Figure 1 illustrates the general idea behind the belief base semantics, especially for what concerns
the relationship between the agents’ belief bases and the agents’ common ground (or context) and the
relationship between the latter and the agents’ implicit beliefs. While an agent’s belief base captures
the agent’s private information, the common ground captures the agents’ public information. An agent’s
implicit belief corresponds to a fact that the agent can deduce from the public information and her private
information.
Given a formula ϕ inLEL, we denote by depth(ϕ) its model depth which is defined as follows:
depth(p) = 0
depth(¬ϕ) = depth(ϕ)
depth(ϕ ∧ψ) = max(depth(ϕ),depth(ψ))
depth(iϕ) = depth(ϕ)+1
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework
2.3 Model classes and validity
In some situations, it may be useful to assume that agents’ beliefs are correct, i.e., what an agent believes
is true. When talking about correct (or true) explicit and implicit beliefs, it is usual to call them explicit
and implicit knowledge. Indeed, we assume that the terms “true belief”, “correct belief” and “knowledge”
are synonyms. The following definition introduces belief correctness for multi-agent belief models.
Definition 7 (Belief correctness). Let (B,Cxt)∈M. We say that (B,Cxt) satisfies belief correctness (BC)
if and only if B ∈ Cxt and, for every B′ ∈ Cxt, B′RiB′.
As the following proposition highlights, belief correctness for multi-agent belief models is com-
pletely characterized by the fact that the actual world is included in the agents’ common ground and that
the agents’ explicit beliefs are correct, i.e., if an agent has α in her belief base then α is true in the actual
state of the world.
Proposition 8. Let (B,Cxt) ∈M. Then, (B,Cxt) satisfies BC if and only if B ∈ Cxt and B′ ∈ CB for all
B′ ∈ Cxt.
We let MBC denote the class of MBMs satisfying property BC.
Let ϕ ∈ LEL, we say that ϕ is valid for the class M, denoted by |=M ϕ , if and only if, for every
(B,Cxt) ∈M, we have (B,Cxt) |= ϕ . We say that ϕ is satisfiable for the class M if and only if ¬ϕ is not
valid for the class M. Satisfiability and validity of a formula ϕ inLEL relative to the class MBC (denoted
by |=MBC ϕ) are defined in an analogous way.
2.4 Equivalence with Kripke semantics
In this section, we show that the belief base semantics for the epistemic language LEL defined in the
previous section is equivalent to the traditional multi-relational Kripke semantics for epistemic logic
[14].
Definition 9 (Multi-relational Kripke model). A multi-relational Kripke model is a structure M =(W,⇒1
, . . . ,⇒n,ω) such that W is a set of states,⇒i⊆W ×W is agent i’s epistemic accessibility relation, and
ω : Atm −→ 2W is a valuation function. Multi-relational Kripke models satisfying reflexivity are those
for which every relation⇒i is reflexive (i.e., for every w ∈W, w⇒i w).
The interpretation of formulas in LEL relative to a multi-relational Kripke model M = (W,⇒1
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, . . . ,⇒n,ω) and a world w in W is defined as follows:
(M,w) |= p iff w ∈ ω(p)
(M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 6|= ϕ
(M,w) |= ϕ ∧ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ and (M,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |=iϕ iff ∀v ∈W : if w⇒i v then (M,v) |= ϕ
Notions of validity and satisfiability relative to the class of multi-relational Kripke models are defined in
the usual way. We denote the fact that ϕ is valid relative to the class of multi-relational Kripke models
(resp. multi-relational Kripke models satisfying reflexivity) by |=KripkeM ϕ (resp. |=ReflKripkeM ϕ).
The equivalence between the belief base semantics for the language LEL and the multi-relational
Kripke semantics is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Let ϕ ∈LEL. Then,
• |=M ϕ if and only if |=KripkeM ϕ ,
• |=MBC ϕ if and only if |=ReflKripkeM ϕ .
3 Universal context
We here define the notion of universal context, as the context containing all possible explicit belief
hierarchies for the agents.
Definition 11 (α-context). Let α ∈L0. We define
Bα = {B ∈ B : B |= α}
to be the α-context. The universal context is simply B> which is the same thing as B.
The formula α in the previous definition corresponds to the concept of integrity constraint, as tradi-
tionally defined in the area of knowledge representation [38, 29].
It is worth to consider a more specific notion of universal context under the assumption of belief
correcteness.
Definition 12 (α-context with belief correctness). Let α ∈L0. We define
CBα = {B ∈ CB : B |= α}
to be the α-context with belief correctness. The universal context with belief correctness is simply CB>
which is the same thing as CB.
Let ϕ ∈ LEL, we say that ϕ is valid relative to the universal context B>, denoted by |=B> ϕ , if
and only if, for every B ∈ B>, we have (B,B>) |= ϕ . Analogously, we say that ϕ is valid relative to
the universal context satisfying BC, denoted by |=CB> ϕ , if and only if, for every B ∈ CB>, we have
(B,CB>) |= ϕ .
We say that ϕ is satisfiable relative to the universal context B> (resp. CB>) if and only if ¬ϕ is not
valid relative to the universal context B> (resp. CB>).
The following theorem highlights that the set of validities for the language LEL relative to the uni-
versal context B> (resp. CB>) and the set of validities relative to the class of models M (resp. MBC) are
the same. In other words, the language LEL is not able to distinguish the universal context including all
possible hierarchies of the agents’ beliefs from incomplete models in which some belief hierarchy may
be missing.
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Theorem 13. Let ϕ ∈LEL. Then,
• |=M ϕ if and only if |=B> ϕ ,
• |=MBC ϕ if and only if |=CB> ϕ .
The following theorem is a corollary of Theorems 10 and 13.
Theorem 14. Let ϕ ∈LEL. Then,
• |=B> ϕ if and only if |=KripkeM ϕ ,
• |=CB> ϕ if and only if |=ReflKripkeM ϕ .
The notion of universal context allows us to easily define the notion of model with maximal general
uncertainty, that is, to say a model in which the agents have maximal uncertainty about the state of the
world as well as maximal uncertainty about the agents’ k-order beliefs for every k ≥ 1, where the order
of a belief is defined inductively as follows: (i) an agent’s belief is order 1 if and only if its content is a
propositional formula that does not mention beliefs; (ii) an agent’s belief is order k+1 if and only it is a
belief about the agents’ k-order beliefs.
Definition 15 (MBM with maximal general uncertainty). Let B = (B1, . . . ,Bn,V) ∈ B such that Bi = /0
for every i ∈ Agt. Then, (B,B>) is called MBM with maximal general uncertainty, while (B,CB>) is
called MBM with maximal general uncertainty and belief correctness.
Note that in our semantics maximal general uncertainty coincides with the fact that the agents’ belief
bases are empty (i.e., the agents do not know anything). The following proposition is a direct consequence
of Theorem 13.
Proposition 16. Let ϕ ∈ LEL, let i ∈ Agt and let (B,B>) (resp. (B,CB>)) be a MBM with maximal
general uncertainty (resp. a MBM with maximal general uncertainty and belief correctness). Then,
• ϕ is satisfiable for the class M if and only if (B,B>) |= ♦iϕ ,
• ϕ is satisfiable for the class MBC if and only if (B,CB>) |= ♦iϕ .
It highlights the essential aspects of models with maximal general uncertainty. To see this, suppose
ϕ and ¬ϕ are both satisfiable for the class M (resp. for the class MBC). Then, by Proposition 16, we have
(B,B>) |=♦iϕ∧♦i¬ϕ (resp. (B,CB>) |=♦iϕ∧♦i¬ϕ), where ♦iϕ∧♦i¬ϕ captures agent i’s uncertainty
about ϕ . More generally, for every formula ϕ yielding information either about the state of the world or
about the agents’ higher-order beliefs, if ϕ and ¬ϕ are both satisfiable, then in a model with maximal
uncertainty every agent i has uncertainty about ϕ .
4 Only believing
The aim of this section is to show that if we increase the expressive power of our multimodal epistemic
language by the notions of ‘believing at most’ and ‘only believing’, then the equivalence result between
the generic semantics in terms of MBMs and the universal context semantics of Section 3 does not hold
anymore.
Let LEEL(Atm,Agt) be the language which extends language LEL by modal operators of implicitly
believing ‘at most’ of the form ∇i, where EEL stands for “Extended Epistemic Logic”. It is defined by
the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1∧ϕ2 |iϕ | ∇iϕ
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where p ranges over Atm and i ranges over Agt. For simplicity, we writeLEEL instead ofLEEL(Atm,Agt),
when the context is unambiguous.
The formula∇iϕ has to be read “agent i believes at most that¬ϕ” and has the following interpretation
relative to MBMs.
Definition 17 (Satisfaction relation (cont.)). Let
B = (B1, . . . ,Bn,V) ∈ B and let (B,Cxt) ∈M. Then:
(B,Cxt) |= ∇iϕ ⇐⇒ ∀B′ ∈
(
Cxt \Ri(B)
)
: (B′,Cxt) |= ϕ
whereRi(B) = {B′ : BRiB′}.
The definition of modal depth of a formula in LEEL extends the definition of the modal depth of
formulas inLEL by the following additional clause:
depth(∇iϕ) = depth(ϕ)+1
By combining the operators i and ∇i in the appropriate way, we can reconstruct the universal
modality [25, 16]:
Uϕ def= iϕ ∧∇iϕ
where Uϕ has to be read “ϕ is universally true”. We can moreover the reconstruct the “only believing”
modality [31, 18, 30]:
Oiϕ
def
= iϕ ∧∇i¬ϕ
where Oiϕ has to be read “all that agent i believes is ϕ”. From the perspective of the logic of only
believing, all that agent i believes is ϕ if and only if agent i believes at least that ϕ is true (i.e., iϕ) and
she believes at most that ϕ is true (i.e., ∇i¬ϕ).
Definitions of validity and satisfiability for formulas inLEEL relative to the class M (resp. MBC) and
relative to the universal context B> (resp. CB>) coincide with those for formulas inLEL given above.
The following theorem highlights that the semantics for the language LEEL based on the universal
context contains more validities than the semantics for the languageLEEL based on the generic class M.
Theorem 18. We have the following relationship between sets of validities:
• {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=M ϕ} ⊂ {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=B> ϕ},
• {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=MBC ϕ} ⊂ {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=CB> ϕ}.
Showing that {ϕ ∈ LEEL :|=M ϕ} ⊆ {ϕ ∈ LEEL :|=B> ϕ} is trivial since (B,B>) ∈ M for every
B ∈ B>. Furthermore, it is easy to find a formula χ such that 6|=M χ and |=B> χ . The following formula
is an example:
χ def= E
( ∧
p∈X
p∧
∧
q∈Y
¬q)
with Eψ def= ¬U¬ψ and finite X ,Y ⊆ Atm such that X ∩Y = /0.
Note that, we can easily adapt the proof of Theorem 10 to show that the set ofLEEL-validities relative
to the class of multi-relational Kripke models and the set of validities relative to the generic belief base
semantics are the same.
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Theorem 19. Let ϕ ∈LEEL. Then,
• |=M ϕ if and only if |=KripkeM ϕ ,
• |=MBC ϕ if and only if |=ReflKripkeM ϕ .
The following is a direct consequence of Theorems 18 and 19.
Theorem 20. We have the following relationship between sets of validities:
• {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=KripkeM ϕ} ⊂ {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=B> ϕ},
• {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=ReflKripkeM ϕ} ⊂ {ϕ ∈LEEL :|=CB> ϕ}.
5 Qualitative belief structures
In this section, we consider a different representation of the universal epistemic model containing all
possible belief hierarchies for the agents in the system first proposed by [12] (see also [13]). Differently
from the definition of the universal context given in Section 3, which does not require any inductive
construction of belief hierarchies, Fagin et al.’s definition of the universal epistemic model is inductive.
As emphasized by [6], Fagin et al.’s universal epistemic model can be seen as qualitative counterpart of
the notion of probabilistic universal type space by [36]. A similar inductive construction of the universal
epistemic model was proposed more recently by [3] (see also [1]), as a semantics for the logic of multi-
agent only knowing.
Fagin et al. study the universal epistemic model for the multimodal logic S5n, including both positive
and negative introspection principles for knowledge. We here consider variants of Fagin et al.’s construc-
tion for the multimodal logics Kn and KTn, the latter including the veracity principle for knowledge
according to which what an agent knows cannot be false.2
Given an arbitrary set Y , let F(Y ) be the set of functions with domain Y and codomain {0,1}. We
define the set Zk in an inductive way as follows:
Z0 =F(Atm)
Zk+1 =Zk×F(Zk)n.
Thus, we have
Zk+1 =Z0×F(Z0)n× . . .×F(Zk)n.
Elements of Z0 are denoted by f0, while elements of F(Zk)n are denoted by fk+1, f ′k+1, . . . Moreover, for
every i ∈ Agt and for every fk+1 ∈ F(Zk)n, fk+1(i) denotes the i-th component in the tuple fk+1.
Elements of Zk are called k+1-ary worlds, or simply k+1-worlds. Elements of
⋃
k∈N0 Zk are called
worlds. The set of worlds is denoted by W.
The set of belief structures is defined as follows:
BS =Z0×F(Z0)n×F(Z1)n× . . .
Thus, a belief structure is a countably infinite sequence f = ( f0, f1, . . .) such that f0 ∈ Z0 and, for every
k ∈N0, fk+1 ∈ F(Zk)n. It follows that f = ( f0, f1, . . .) is a belief structure if and only if, for every k ∈N0,
( f0, . . . , fk) is a k+1-world.
2Belle & Lakemeyer [3] offer an inductive construction of the universal epistemic model for the multimodal logic K45n.
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Definition 21 (Coherent world and belief structure). A world ( f0, . . . , fk) is said to be coherent if and
only if, the following conditions hold:
• for every i ∈ Agt and for every 2≤ h≤ k:
if fh(i)(g0, . . . ,gh−1) = 1 then fh−1(i)(g0, . . . ,gh−2) = 1;
• for every i ∈ Agt and for every 1≤ h≤ k−1:
if fh(i)(g0, . . . ,gh−1) = 1 then there exists gh ∈ F(Zh−1)n such that fh+1(i)(g0, . . . ,gh−1,gh) = 1.
The set of coherent worlds is denoted by CW. We say that the belief structure f = ( f0, f1, . . .) is coherent
if, for every k ∈ N0, ( f0, . . . , fk) is a coherent world. The set of coherent belief structures is denoted by
CBS.
The following definition introduces the property of correctness for worlds and belief structures.
Definition 22 (Correct world and belief structure). A world ( f0, . . . , fk) with k ≥ 1 satisfies belief cor-
rectness if and only if, for every i ∈ Agt, fk(i)( f0, . . . , fk−1) = 1. The set of coherent worlds satisfying
belief correctness (BC) is denoted by CWBC. We say that the belief structure f = ( f0, f1, . . .) is correct
if, for every k ≥ 1, ( f0, . . . , fk) is a correct world. The set of coherent belief structures satisfying belief
correctness (BC) is denoted by CBSBC.
A formula ϕ of the languageLEEL is interpreted relative to a coherent k+1-world ( f0, . . . , fk)∈CW
such that k ≥ depth(ϕ), as follows:
( f0, . . . , fk) |= p ⇐⇒ f0(p) = 1
( f0, . . . , fk) |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ ( f0, . . . , fk) 6|= ϕ
( f0, . . . , fk) |= ϕ ∧ψ ⇐⇒ ( f0, . . . , fk) |= ϕ and ( f0, . . . , fk) |= ψ
( f0, . . . , fk) |=iϕ ⇐⇒ ∀(g0, . . . ,gk−1) ∈ Zk−1 :
if fk(i)(g0, . . . ,gk−1) = 1
then (g0, . . . ,gk−1) |= ϕ
( f0, . . . , fk) |= ∇iϕ ⇐⇒ ∀(g0, . . . ,gk−1) ∈ Zk−1 :
if fk(i)(g0, . . . ,gk−1) = 0
then (g0, . . . ,gk−1) |= ϕ
The following proposition is a generalization of [12, Lemma 2.5] to the languageLEEL.3
Proposition 23. Let depth(ϕ) = h, k ≥ h, and ( f0, . . . , fh),( f0, . . . , fk) ∈ CW. Then, ( f0, . . . , fh) |= ϕ if
and only if ( f0, . . . , fk) |= ϕ .
Let ϕ ∈LEEL and let f = ( f0, f1, . . .) ∈ CBS be a coherent belief structure. We say that f satisfies
ϕ , denoted by f |= ϕ if ( f0, . . . , fh) |= ϕ where h = depth(ϕ). It is worth noting that, by Proposition
23, if k ≥ h then f |= ϕ if and only if ( f0, . . . , fk) |= ϕ . We moreover say that ϕ is valid relative to the
class CBS, denoted by |=CBS ϕ , if f |= ϕ for every f ∈ CBS. We say that ϕ is satisfiable relative to the
class CBS if 6|=CBS ¬ϕ . Definitions of validity relative to the class CBSBC (denoted by |=CBSBC ϕ) and
satisfiability are defined analogously.
It is straightforward to adapt the proof of [12][Theorem 3.1] in order to prove the following equiv-
alence result between the coherent belief structure semantics and the Kripke semantics relative to the
languageLEL.
3[12, Lemma 2.5] only applies to the standard epistemic language with epistemic operators i and without operators ∇i.
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Theorem 24. Let ϕ ∈LEL. Then,
• |=CBS ϕ if and only if |=KripkeM ϕ ,
• |=CBSBC ϕ if and only if |=ReflKripkeM ϕ .
The following theorem is a corollary of Theorems 14 and 24.
Theorem 25. Let ϕ ∈LEL. Then,
• |=B> ϕ if and only if |=CBS ϕ ,
• |=CB> ϕ if and only if |=CBSBC ϕ .
The following theorem strengthens Theorem 25 by stating that the set of LEEL-validites relative to
the universal context B> (resp. CB>) is the same as the set of LEEL-validites relative to the class CBS
(resp. CBSBC).
Theorem 26. Let ϕ ∈LEEL. Then,
• |=B> ϕ if and only if |=CBS ϕ ,
• |=CB> ϕ if and only if |=CBSBC ϕ .
More generally, not even the epistemic language LEEL — which extends the language LEL by the
notions of ‘believing at most’ and ‘only believing’ — can distinguish the belief structure semantics à la
Fagin et al. from the universal context semantics exploiting the belief base abstraction.
6 Model checking
The notions of α-context and universal context defined in Section 3 (Definition 11) allow us to offer a
compact formulation of the model checking problem for the formulas in the languageLEL.4
α-context model checking
Given: ϕ ∈LEL, α ∈L0 and a finite B ∈ B.
Question: Do we have (B,Bα) |= ϕ?
where the multi-agent belief base (MBB) B = (B1, . . . ,Bn,V) is said to be finite if V and every Bi are
finite.
Note that, if α = >, then model checking consists in verifying whether ϕ is true at a given finite
MBB of the universal context, that is, in verifying whether (B,B>) |= ϕ for a specific finite B ∈ B>.
The model checking problem for multi-agent epistemic logic Kn interpreted relative to the standard
multi-relational Kripke semantics of Definition 9 is known to be P-complete with respect to the size of
the input formula to be checked and the size of the model [17]. In this section, we are going to show that
the previous compact formulation of the model checking problem for the formulas in LEL is PSPACE-
hard, the same complexity as the corresponding satisfiability problem. Our result highlights that the gains
in terms of compactness of the model checking problem are counterbalanced by losses on the complexity
side.
We provide a polynomial reduction of true quantified boolean formulas (TQBF) to model checking
for formulas inLEL.
4 Other compact formulations of the epistemic logic model checking have been proposed in the literature. For instance [32]
provide a semantics for epistemic logic model checking based on the concept of interpreted system, while the approach by
[5, 27, 10] builds on propositional observability.
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Let us assume that a quantified boolean formula χ is in (not necessarily closed) prenex normal form
and can be written as follows:
λ .pi
where pi is a propositional formula and λ is a (possibly empty) sequence Q0 p0 . . .Qm pm such that
{p0, . . . , pm} ⊆ Atm(pi) and Q0, . . . ,Qm ∈ {∃,∀}, with Atm(pi) denoting the set of atoms occurring in
pi . If {p0, . . . , pm} = Atm(pi) then χ is said to be closed, as it has no free variables. The length of χ is
defined to be the length of the sequence p0 . . . pm. For notational convenience, when λ is non empty, we
write λ [k] to denote the propositional variable in the k-th position in the sequence p0 . . . pm.
Let us suppose that the language of quantified boolean formulas is built over the set of atomic vari-
ables Atm. Moreover, let us define the following translation from the language of quantified boolean
formulas to the languageLEL(Atm,{1}):
tr(p) = for p ∈ Atm
tr
(∀pλ .pi)=[[λ ]]tr(λ .pi)
where
[[λ ]]ψ def= 1(©1λ [0]→ ψ)
and
©1λ [0] def= ♦1λ [0]∧♦1¬λ [0] if λ is non-empty
©1λ [0] def= > otherwise
and where the Boolean connectives are translated homomorphically. We define the dual operator of [[λ ]]
as follows:
〈〈λ 〉〉ψ def= ¬[[λ ]]¬ψ.
For every quantified boolean formula χ = λ .pi =Q0 p0 . . .Qm pm.pi and for every V ⊆ Atm, we define:
Σχ,V =
(
(Atm(pi)\{λ [0]})∩V)∪
{¬q : q ∈ (Atm(pi)\{λ [0]})\V}∪⋃
1≤k≤m
{4k−11
∧
q∈Atm(pi)\{λ [k]}
(41q∨41¬q)}
where4k−11 α is inductively defined as follows:
4k−11 α def= α if k = 1
4k−11 α def= 414k−21 α if k > 1
Moreover, let us define
B(χ,V) =
(
B(χ,V)1 ,V
)
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where
B(χ,V)1 = Σχ,V if λ is non-empty
B(χ,V)1 = /0 otherwise
The following lemma is crucial for proving the main result of this section about complexity of model
checking for formulas inLEL.
Lemma 1. Let V ⊆ Atm and let χ = λ .pi be a quantified boolean formula. Then, V |= χ if and only if(
B(χ,V),B>
) |= tr(χ).
Thanks to Lemma 1 and the fact that the TQBF problem (i.e., the problem of checking whether
a quantified boolean formula is true in a given valuation) is PSPACE-hard [41], we have a PSPACE-
hardness result for model checking of LEL-formulas. Indeed, let χ = Q0 p0 . . .Qm pm.pi be a quantified
boolean formula. Then, the sizes of B(χ,V)1 and tr(χ) are polynomial in m. Therefore, by Lemma 1 we
have a polynomial reduction of the TQBF problem into EL-model checking. Since the former is PSPACE-
hard, then the latter is PSPACE-hard too.
Theorem 27. The α-context model checking problem for formulas inLEL is PSPACE-hard.
From [19] we know that satisfiability checking for LEL-formulas relative to multi-relational Kripke
models of Definition 9 is PSPACE-complete. Thus, thanks to Theorem 14, we can conclude that satis-
fiability checking for LEL-formulas relative to the universal context B> is PSPACE-complete as well.
Consequently, Theorem 27 also shows that the compact version of model checking for LEL-formulas
exploiting the notion of α-context is at least as complex as satisfiability checking forLEL-formulas.
7 Conclusion
We have offered a novel representation of the universal epistemic model which does not require an
inductive construction of the agents’ belief hierarchies. Our solution exploits the notion of belief base, a
natural abstraction for representing epistemic attitudes of rational players in interactive situations, widely
used in the area of knowledge representation and reasoning (KR). Our lower bound complexity result
for model checking relative to the universal epistemic model clearly displays the trade-off between the
compactness of the model checking problem representation and its computational complexity.
Directions of future research are manifold. As emphasized in Section 5, Fagin et al.’s original defi-
nition of the universal epistemic model applies to the epistemic logic S5n which includes principles of
positive and negative introspection for knowledge (i.e., if an agent knows that ϕ/does not know that ϕ ,
then she knows that she knows that ϕ/does not know that ϕ). The logics we presented in this paper do
not make any assumption about introspection for belief or knowledge. Future work will be devoted to
extend our analysis of the universal epistemic model to variants of epistemic logic with introspection.
We also plan to extend our comparative analysis of the different semantics for epistemic logic to more
expressive epistemic languages including common belief and distributed belief operators. Last but not
least, we plan to explore the connection between the representation of agents’ belief hierarchies using
the belief base abstraction and type spaces with finite depth of reasoning as defined in [28]. Indeed, the
belief base abstraction allows to naturally define the notion of k-level (resource-bounded) reasoner, as an
agent whose belief base contains explicit beliefs of at most order k. This is clearly related to the idea of
type spaces with finite depth of reasoning à la Kets.
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A Proofs
This appendix presents a selection of the proofs of the technical results presented in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. We only prove the first item. The proof of the second item is similar.
In order to prove the right-to-left direction we show that if ϕ is satisfiable for M then it is satisfiable
for the class of multi-relational Kripke models. Let (B,Cxt) ∈M such that (B,Cxt) |= ϕ . We build the
multi-relational Kripke model M = (W,⇒1, . . . ,⇒n,ω) corresponding to (B,Cxt) as follows:
• W = {wB′ : B′ ∈ {B}∪Cxt},
• for every i ∈ Agt and for every wB′ ,wB′′ ∈W , wB′ ⇒i wB′′ iff B′RiB′′,
• for every p ∈ Atm, ω(p) = {wB′ ∈W : B′ |= p},
Clearly, we have (M,wB) |= ϕ iff (B,Cxt) |= ϕ . Thus, (M,wB) |= ϕ since we supposed that (B,Cxt) |= ϕ .
As for the left-to-right direction suppose ϕ is satisfiable for the class of multi-relational Kripke
models. We know that the multimodal logic Kn interpreted relative to multi-relational Kripke models has
the finite model property. Consequently, there exists a finite multi-relational Kripke model M = (W,⇒1
, . . . ,⇒n,ω) and w ∈W such that (M,w) |= ϕ . Let name : W → Atm \Atm(ϕ) be an injective function.
Such an injection exists since the set W is finite and the the set Atm is assumed to be infinite. We define
the context Cxt = {Bv : v ∈W} where, for every v ∈W and for every i ∈ Agt,
Bvi = {
∨
u∈W :v⇒iu
name(u)},
and Vv =
(
ω(v)∩Atm(ϕ))∪{name(v)}. By induction on the structure of ϕ , it is routine task to show
that (Bw,Cxt) |= ϕ iff (M,w) |= ϕ . Thus, (Bw,Cxt) |= ϕ since (M,w) |= ϕ .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. We prove the first item, as the proof of the second item is analogous.
Left-to-right direction is obvious. As for the right-to-left direction, we prove that if ϕ is satisfiable
relative to the class M, then it is satisfiable relative to the universal context.
Let (B,Cxt) ∈M such that (B,Cxt) |= ϕ . We build the multi-relational Kripke model M = (W,⇒1
, . . . ,⇒n,ω) corresponding to (B,Cxt) as follows:
• W = {wB′ : B′ ∈ {B}∪Cxt},
• for every i ∈ Agt and for every wB′ ,wB′′ ∈W , wB′ ⇒i wB′′ iff B′RiB′′,
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• for every p ∈ Atm, ω(p) = {wB′ ∈W : B′ |= p},
where the interpretation of formulas relative to a multi-relational Kripke model M = (W,⇒1, . . . ,⇒n,ω)
and a world w in W was defined in Section 2.4. Clearly, we have (M,wB) |= ϕ iff (B,Cxt) |= ϕ . Thus, we
have (M,wB) |= ϕ since (B,Cxt) |= ϕ .
In what follows, for notational convenience we denote elements of W by w,v,u, . . .
We define the filtration of M. Let Σ⊆LEL be an arbitrary finite set of formulas which is closed under
subformulas. (Cf. Definition 2.35 in [8] for a definition of subformulas closed set of formulas.) Let the
equivalence relation ≡Σ on W be defined as follows. For all w,v ∈W :
w≡Σ v iff ∀ϕ ∈ Σ : (M,w) |= ϕ iff (M,v) |= ϕ.
Let |w|Σ be the equivalence class of the world w with respect to the equivalence relation ≡Σ.
We define WΣ to be the filtrated set of worlds with respect to Σ:
WΣ = {|w|Σ : w ∈W}.
Clearly, WΣ is a finite set.
Let us define the filtrated valuation function ωΣ. For every p ∈ Atm, we define:
ωΣ(p) = {|w|Σ : (M,w) |= p} if p ∈ Atm(Σ)
ωΣ(p) = /0 otherwise
with Atm(Σ) =
⋃
ψ∈ΣAtm(ψ).
Finally, for every i ∈ Agt, we define agent i’s accessibility relation as follows:
⇒i,Σ= {(|w|Σ, |v|Σ) : |w|Σ, |v|Σ ∈WΣ and w⇒i v}.
Let us define:
⇒Σ=
⋃
i∈Agt
⇒i,Σ .
The model (WΣ,⇒1,Σ, . . . ,⇒n,Σ,ωΣ) is the smallest filtration of M under Σ. Let M{ϕ}=(W{ϕ},⇒1,{ϕ}
, . . . ,⇒n,{ϕ},ω{ϕ}). Clearly, we have (M{ϕ}, |wB|{ϕ}) |= ϕ since (M,wB) |= ϕ .
In what follows, for notational convenience we denote elements of W{ϕ} by x,y, . . .
The next step of the proof consists in unraveling the finite model M{ϕ} up to the modal depth of ϕ .
Let
Seq(ϕ) = {(x0, . . . ,xk) : k ≤ depth(ϕ) and x0, . . . ,xk ∈W{ϕ}}
be the set of sequences of worlds in W{ϕ} of length at most depth(ϕ). Elements of Seq(ϕ) are denoted by−→x ,−→y , . . . The length of the sequence −→x is denoted by length(−→x ). For every 0 ≤ k ≤ length(−→x ), −→x [k]
denotes the k-th element in −→x while −→x [last] denotes the last element in −→x . Let −→x = (x0, . . . ,xk), we
write −→x .y to denote the sequence (x0, . . . ,xk,y).
We define the tree-like multi-relational Kripke model M′ = (W ′,⇒′1, . . . ,⇒′n,ω ′) as follows:
• W ′ = {−→x ∈ Seq(ϕ) :−→x [0] = |wB|{ϕ} and ∀0≤ k < length(−→x ),−→x [k]⇒{ϕ} −→x [k+1]},
• for every i ∈ Agt and for every −→x ,−→y ∈W ′, −→x ⇒′i −→y iff ∃y ∈W{ϕ} such that −→y = −→x .y and−→x [last]⇒i,{ϕ} y,
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• for every p ∈ Atm, ω ′(p) = {−→x ∈W ′ :−→x [last] ∈ ω{ϕ}(p)}.
Clearly, the tree-like model M′ is finite.
By induction on the structure of ϕ , it is routine exercise to check that (M′,−→x0 ) |= ϕ iff
(M{ϕ}, |wB|{ϕ}) |= ϕ , with −→x0 = (|wB|{ϕ}). Thus, (M′,−→x0 ) |= ϕ since (M{ϕ}, |wB|{ϕ}) |= ϕ .
Now, let us denote by TermM′ the set of terminal nodes in the tree M′. That is, TermM′ = {−→x ∈W ′ :
∀−→y ∈W ′ , −→x 6⇒′ −→y } with⇒′=⋃i∈Agt⇒′i.
We define k-level explicit mutual belief that α in an inductive way as follows:
EB0α def= α
EBk+1α def= EB EBkα
MBkα def=
∧
0≤h≤k
EBhα
where EBα def=
∧
i∈Agt4iα .
We define the labelling function L over nodes in W ′ as follows:
L(−→x ) =
∧
p∈Val(ϕ,−→x )
p∧
∧
p∈Atm(ϕ)\Val(ϕ,−→x )
¬p∧
∧
i∈Agt
4i⊥
if −→x ∈ TermM′
L(−→x ) =
∧
p∈Val(ϕ,−→x )
p∧
∧
p∈Atm(ϕ)\Val(ϕ,−→x )
¬p∧
∧
i∈Agt
4i
∨
−→y :−→x⇒′i−→y
L(−→y )
if −→x ∈W ′ \TermM′
where Val(ϕ,−→x ) = {p ∈ Atm(ϕ) : (M′,−→x ) |= p} is the set of atoms in ϕ which are true at −→x . Note that
every L(−→x ) is a (finitary) formula of the languageL0.
The labelling function is used to construct, for every i ∈ Agt, the L0-formula which corresponds to
the “tree” of valuations rooted in (|wB|{ϕ}).
Let −→x0 = (|wB|{ϕ}) and let B′ = (B′1, . . . ,B′n,V ′) such that:
• for every i ∈ Agt, B′i =
⋃
p∈Atm\Atm(ϕ){MBdepth(ϕ)¬p}∪{
∨−→y ∈W ′:−→x0⇒′i−→y L(−→y )},
• V ′ = {p :−→x0 ∈ ω ′(p)}.
Furthermore, let us define the (universal) multi-relational Kripke model M′′ = (W ′′,⇒′′1, . . . ,⇒′′n,ω ′′)
corresponding to the universal context B> as follows: (i) W ′′= {wB′′ : B′′ ∈B>}, (ii) for every i∈ Agt and
for every wB′′ ,wB′′′ ∈W , wB′′⇒i wB′′′ iff B′′RiB′′′, and (iii) for every p∈Atm,ω(p)= {wB′′ ∈W : B′′ |= p}.
By construction of B′, we can show that (M′′,wB′) and (M′,−→x0 ) with −→x0 = (|wB|{ϕ}) are depth(ϕ)-
bisimilar [8, Definition 2.30]. Thus, (M′′,wB′) |= ϕ since (M′,−→x0 ) |= ϕ . It follows that (B′,B>) |= ϕ ,
since clearly (M′′,wB′) |= ϕ iff (B′,B>) |= ϕ .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 23
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the formulas. Boolean cases are trivial. The case
ϕ =iψ is proved in the same way as [12, Lemma 2.5]. Let us prove the case ϕ =∇iψ . Assume that k≥
h= depth(ϕ) and ( f0, . . . , fk) |=∇iψ . Since ϕ =iψ , we have h≥ 1. Moreover, let (g0, . . . ,gh−1)∈ Zh−1
such that fh(i)(g0, . . . ,gh−1) = 0. By Definition 21, for all (g0, . . . ,gk−1) ∈ Zk−1, fk(i)(g0, . . . ,gk−1) = 0.
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Since ( f0, . . . , fk) |= ∇iψ , it follows by definition that (g0, . . . ,gk−1) |= ψ for all (g0, . . . ,gk−1) ∈ Zk−1.
Thus, by induction hypothesis, (g0, . . . ,gh−1) |= ψ . It follows that, for every (g0, . . . ,gh−1) ∈ Zh−1 such
that fh(i)(g0, . . . ,gh−1) = 0, (g0, . . . ,gh−1) |= ψ . Thus, ( f0, . . . , fh) |= ∇iψ . The proof of the other direc-
tion is similar.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 26
Proof. We only prove the first item. The second item can be proved in a similar way.
Let ϕ ∈LEEL. We will prove that ϕ is satisfiable relative to B> iff ϕ is satisfiable relative to the class
CBS.
We build the multi-relational Kripke model M = (W,R1, . . . ,Rn,Rc1, . . . ,R
c
n,ω) corresponding to
the Atm(ϕ)-restriction of the universal context B> as follows:
• W = {B′ ∈ B> : ∀q ∈ Atm\Atm(ϕ) and ∀k ≥ 0 : (B′,B>) |=MBk¬q},
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all B′,B′′ ∈W , B′Rci B′′ iff B′′ 6∈Ri(B′),
• for all p ∈ Atm, ω(p) = {B′ ∈W : B′ |= p},
where the k-level mutual belief operator MBk is defined as in the proof of Theorem 13 (Section A.2). In
what follows, for notational convenience we denote elements of W by w,v,u, . . . Interpretation ofLEEL-
formulas relative to M and to a world w ∈W is defined as in Section 2.4 for boolean formulas and for
formula iϕ . We add the following clause for the ∇i-operator:
(M,w) |= ∇iϕ iff ∀v 6∈Ri(w) : (M,v) |= ϕ
We leave to the reader the task of checking that ϕ is satisfiable relative to B> iff M satisfies ϕ .
Similarly, we build the multi-relational Kripke model M′ = (W ′,T1, . . . ,Tn,T c1 , . . . ,T
c
n ,ω ′) corre-
sponding to the Atm(ϕ)-restriction of the set of coherent belief structures as follows:
• W ′ = { f ∈CBS : ∀q∈ Atm\Atm(ϕ), f0(q) = 0 and if g0(q) = 1 then fk(i)(g0, . . . ,gk−1) = 0,∀k≥
0,∀i ∈ Agt,∀g ∈ CBS},
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all f ,g ∈W ′, fTig iff
fk(i)(g0, . . . ,gk−1) = 1 for all k > 1,
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all f ,g ∈W ′, fT ci g iff g 6∈Ti( f ),
• for all p ∈ Atm, ω ′(p) = { f ∈W ′ : f0(p) = 1}.
Interpretation of LEEL-formulas relative to M′ and to a world f ∈W ′ is defined as usual. We have the
following truth conditions for the operators i and ∇i:
(M,w) |=iϕ iff ∀v ∈W : if wTiv then (M,v) |= ϕ
(M,w) |= ∇iϕ iff ∀v ∈W : if wT ci v then (M,v) |= ϕ
We leave to the reader the task of checking that ϕ is satisfiable relative to CBS iff M′ satisfies ϕ .
For every world w∈W in the Kripke model M, we build a coherent belief structure f w =( f w0 , f w1 , . . .).
We define f w0 to be the function such that, for every p∈ Atm, f w0 (p) = 1 iff w∈ω(p). Moreover, suppose
f w0 , . . . , f
w
k have been defined for each w∈W . Then, we define f wk+1 to be the function such that, for every
i ∈ Agt, f wk+1(i)−1({1}) = {(gv0, . . . ,gvk) : w⇒i v} where f wk+1(i)−1({1}) is the inverse image by f wk+1(i)
of the subset {1} of the codomain {0,1}.
Let us define the mapping τ : w 7→ f w from W to W ′. The following intermediate proposition will be
useful for the rest of the proof.
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Proposition 28. Let f ∈W ′. Then, there exists v ∈W such that τ(v) = f .
Proof. Let f = ( f0, f1, . . .) ∈W ′. We show how to construct v ∈W such that τ(v) = f .
Let us define:
βi,( f0, f1)
def
=
∨
g0∈Z0: f1(i)(g0)=1
g0(ϕ)
where
g0(ϕ)
def
=
∧
p∈Atm(ϕ):g0(p)=1
p∧
∧
p∈Atm(ϕ):g0(p)=0
¬p.
Moreover, for every k > 1, let us define:
βi,( f0,..., fk)
def
=
∨
(g0,...,gk−1)∈Zk−1: fk(i)(g0,...,gk−1)=1
(
g0(ϕ)∧
∧
j∈Agt
4 jβ j,(g0,...,gk−1)
)
.
Note that βi,( f0, f1) and every βi,( f0,..., fk) are (finitary) formulas ofL0.
We define the multi-agent belief base B f = (B f1 , . . . ,B
f
n ,V f ) as follows:
B fi =
⋃
k≥1
{βi,( f0,..., fk)}∪
⋃
k≥0,q∈Atm\Atm(ϕ)
{MBk¬q},
V f = {p ∈ Atm : f0(p) = 1}.
Clearly, B f belongs to W ′. Moreover, it is the case that the multi-agent belief base B fi and the belief
structure f define the same belief hierarchy. Specifically, we have τ(B f ) = f .
By means of Proposition 28, we can show that the relation {(w, f )∈W×W ′ : τ(w)= f} is a bisimula-
tion between the Kripke models M and M′. Therefore, suppose (M,v) |=ϕ . It follows that (M′,τ(v)) |=ϕ .
Viceversa, suppose (M′, f ) |= ϕ . Then, by Proposition 28, there exists v ∈W such that τ(v) = f . Since v
and f are bisimilar, we have (M,v) |= ϕ .
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 1, we first prove the following intermediate result.
Lemma 2. Let V ⊆ Atm and let χ = λ .pi be a quantified boolean formula. Moreover, let B′ = (B′1,V ′),B′′
= (B′′1,V
′′) ∈ B such that (V ∩Atm(pi)) = (V ′ ∩Atm(pi)) = (V ′′ ∩Atm(pi)), B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′1, B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′′1 ,
(B′,B>) |=©1λ [0] and (B′′,B>) |=©1λ [0]. Then, (B′,B>) |= tr(χ) iff (B′′,B>) |= tr(χ).
Proof. Let B′=(B′1,V
′) and B′′=(B′′1,V
′′). We assume
(
V∩Atm(pi))= (V ′∩Atm(pi))= (V ′′∩Atm(pi)),
B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′1, B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′′1 , (B′,B>) |=©1λ [0] and (B′′,B>) |=©1λ [0].
The proof of the lemma is by induction on the length of the formula χ .
Base case Let λ be the empty sequence. Clearly, B′ |= pi iff B′′ |= pi , since (V ′ ∩Atm(pi)) = (V ′′ ∩
Atm(pi)
)
. Therefore,
(
B′,B>
) |= pi iff (B′′,B>) |= pi .
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Inductive case We prove that the statement is true for sequence λ of length k+ 1, if we suppose it is
true for sequence λ of length k. Suppose λ has length k+1. Therefore, we can assume that λ = Qpλ ′.
We assume Q = ∀. The proof for Q = ∃ is analogous.
Let
R[[λ ′]] = {(B′′′,B′′′′) ∈R1 : (B′′′′,B>) |=©1λ ′[0]}.
Clearly, for all B′′′ ∈ B>, we have
(B′′′,B>) |= [[λ ′]]ψ iff (B′′′′,B>) |= ψ for all B′′′′ ∈R[[λ ′]](B′′′).
Now, suppose (B′,B>) |= tr(∀pλ ′.pi). The latter is equivalent to (B′,B>) |= [[λ ′]]tr(λ ′.pi). The latter
is equivalent to
(B′′′,B>) |= tr(λ ′.pi) for all B′′′ ∈R[[λ ′]](B′).
For all B′′′ ∈ (R[[λ ′]](B′)∪R[[λ ′]](B′′)), we clearly have:
(B′′′,B>) |=©1λ ′[0].
since B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′1 and B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′′1 . Moreover, by the initial assumption that
(
V ∩ Atm(pi)) = (V ′ ∩
Atm(pi)
)
=
(
V ′′∩Atm(pi)), B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′1 and B(χ,V)1 ⊆ B′′1 , for all B′′′ ∈ (R[[λ ′]](B′)∪R[[λ ′]](B′′)) we have:
B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p})
1 ⊆ B′′′1 ;
B(λ
′.pi,V\{p})
1 ⊆ B′′′1 ;(
(V ∪{p})∩Atm(pi))= (V ′′′∩Atm(pi)) or(
(V \{p})∩Atm(pi))= (V ′′′∩Atm(pi)).
Furthermore, by the fact that (B′,B>) |=©1 p and (B′′,B>) |=©1 p, we have that:
∀B′′′′ ∈R[[λ ′]](B′′),∃B′′′ ∈R[[λ ′]](B′)
such that
(
V ′′′′∩Atm(pi))= (V ′′′∩Atm(pi)).
Therefore, by induction hypothesis and the fact that (B′′′,B>) |= tr(λ ′.pi) for all B′′′ ∈R[[λ ′]](B′), we
have:
(B′′′′,B>) |= tr(λ ′.pi) for all B′′′′ ∈R[[λ ′]](B′′).
The latter is equivalent to (B′′,B>) |= [[λ ′]]tr(λ ′.pi) which is equivalent to (B′′,B>) |= tr(Qpλ ′.pi).
In an analogous way, we can prove that (B′′,B>) |= tr(Qpλ ′.pi) implies (B′,B>) |= tr(Qpλ ′.pi).
We can now go back to the statement of Lemma 1 and prove it. The proof of the lemma is by induction
on the length of the formula λ .
Base case Suppose λ is the empty sequence and V |= pi . By construction of B(χ,V), the latter is equiva-
lent to B(χ,V) |= pi . The latter is equivalent to (B(χ,V),B>) |= pi .
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Inductive case We prove that the statement is true for sequence λ of length k+ 1, if we suppose it is
true for sequence λ of length k. Suppose λ has length k+1. Therefore, χ can be written as Qpλ ′.pi . We
assume Q = ∃, as the proof for Q = ∀ is analogous.
(⇒) Suppose V |= ∃pλ ′.pi . The latter is equivalent to saying that V ∪{p} |= λ ′.pi or V \{p} |= λ ′.pi .
By induction hypothesis, the latter implies that(
B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p}),B>
) |= tr(λ ′.pi),or(
B(λ
′.pi,V\{p}),B>
) |= tr(λ ′.pi).
It is easy to check that
B(χ,V) R1 B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p}), and
B(χ,V) R1 B(λ
′.pi,V\{p}).
Moreover, (
B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p}),B>
) |=©1λ ′[0], and(
B(λ
′.pi,V\{p}),B>
) |=©1λ ′[0].
Therefore, (
B(χ,V),B>
) |= 〈〈λ ′〉〉tr(λ ′.pi).
The latter is equivalent to
(
B(χ,V),B>
) |= tr(χ).
(⇐) Suppose (B(χ,V),B>) |= tr(∃pλ ′.pi). Hence, (B(χ,V),B>) |= 〈〈λ ′〉〉tr(λ ′.pi). The latter implies
that
∃B′ ∈R[[λ ′]]
(
B(χ,V)
)
such that
(
B′,B>
) |= tr(λ ′.pi)
whereR[[λ ′]] is defined as in the proof of Lemma 2.
For all B′ ∈R[[λ ′]]
(
B(χ,V)
)
, we clearly have:
(B′,B>) |=©1λ ′[0].
Moreover, for all B′ ∈R[[λ ′]]
(
B(χ,V)
)
, we have:
B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p})
1 ⊆ B′1;
B(λ
′.pi,V\{p})
1 ⊆ B′1;(
(V ∪{p})∩Atm(pi))= (V ′∩Atm(pi)) or(
(V \{p})∩Atm(pi))= (V ′∩Atm(pi)).
Finally, we have:
B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p}) ∈R[[λ ′]]
(
B(χ,V)
)
and B(λ
′.pi,V\{p}) ∈R[[λ ′]]
(
B(χ,V)
)
.
Thus, by Lemma 2 and the fact that there exists B′ ∈ R[[λ ′]]
(
B(χ,V)
)
such that
(
B′,B>
) |= tr(λ ′.pi), we
have: (
B(λ
′.pi,V∪{p}),B>
) |= tr(λ ′.pi), or(
B(λ
′.pi,V\{p}),B>
) |= tr(λ ′.pi).
By induction hypothesis, the latter implies that V∪{p} |= λ ′.pi or V \{p} |= λ ′.pi . The latter is equivalent
to V |= ∃pλ ′.pi .
